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Gupta (2000) considered child worker’s wage determination process as a
Nash bargaining game between the employer and the guardian of the child
worker. In our paper, we first solve Gupta’s bargaing problem with minimum
wage by using Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution. We compare
these two solutions to examine the effect of minimum wage policy: which so-
lution type is favorable to the guardian depending on the amount of the min-
imum wage. Then, we develop Gupta’s model by considering the guardian’s
altruistic concern toward the child worker. In this new model, with regard to
the child labor supply, we find consistency with Basu and Van (1998)’s luxury
axiom. We also show that the subsidy provided to the poor guardian may
induce Pareto improvement.
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1 Introduction
Child labor market is an unusual market in a sense that the decision of labor
supply is not determined by child workers, but usually by the parents of the
child. Most research on child labor pays attention to this feature and cares
about what they have assumed on household behavior. On the other hand,
since firms consider child labor as a factor of production, assumptions on child
labor production play an important role.
Basu and Van (1998) have captured these two features and established a
model analyzing child labor. Luxury axiom, which means that child labor
occurs only when the household income from non-child labor is lower than a
certain level, is an assumption on household behavior. Substitution axiom,
which means that adult labor and child labor are substitutes from the firm’s
point of view, is an assumption on labor market.
Since these features had priority in analyzing child labor, most research
on child labor has followed traditional market equilibrium concepts. Basu
and Van (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000), the most influential papers
in this area, assume perfectly competitive labor market, which implies that a
child worker is paid as much as what he has produced. Many papers analyzing
child labor use perfectly competitive labor market assumptions since it makes
the analysis simple and follows the tradition.
There has been an attempt to modify this perfectly competitive market
assumption. Grossmann and Michaelis (2007) have used monopolistic com-
petition model. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) have suggested failures of the
markets for labor and land in order to explain their empirical findings.
In labor economics literature, Nash bargaining game is commonly used
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in wage determination. Nash (1950) proposed theoretical discussion of two
person bargaining problem. McDonald and Solow (1981) provided a formal
bargaining model of wage determination between the employer and the labor
union. Starting from Diamond (1981) and Mortensen (1982a, 1982b), analysis
that uses a matching function for determining meetings and bargaining for
determining wages became popular.1
Based on this literature, Gupta (2000) suggested to use a simple Nash
bargaining game in determining the child workers’ wage. In his model, the
employer and the guardian of the child have a certain amount of bargaining
power, so that they jointly determine the wage of the child. Moreover, he
analyzed his model with a minimum wage and with an adult labor market
respectively. Although Gupta’s framework is well designed, there are few
succeeding works analyzing child labor using a bargaining approach.
This paper modifies two features of Gupta’s model. First, Gupta (2000)
uses Nash solution that maximizes the product of each player’s payoff in order
to solve Nash bargaining problem. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) provided
another solution type that solves Nash bargaining problem. Both Nash and
Kalai Smorodinsky solutions are most popular solution types of Nash bargain-
ing problem. In the first part of this paper, we will solve Gupta’s bargaining
problem by using Kalai Smorodinsky solution and compare this result with
Nash solution. In particular, we will pay attention to the bargaining prob-
lem with a minimum wage and compare these solutions with respect to the
minimum wage level.
The second feature is that nobody cares about the child’s welfare in Gupta’s
model. This point has been much criticized since the parents just treat their
1See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
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child as a tool for earning household income.2 Most research analyzing child
labor considers parents’ altruistic concern about their child to some extent.
In the second part of this paper, we will provide a new bargaining model con-
sidering parents’ altruism toward their child. Then, we will also solve this
bargaining model by using Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution and
compare these two solutions.
In section 2, we will introduce Gupta (2000)’s bargaining game. Then,
we will solve the bargaining problem by using two representative solution
concepts, Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution, and compare two
solutions, in section 3 and 4. In section 5, we will provide a new bargaining
model, and then we will also solve the new bargaining problem by using two
solution types and compare these two solutions in section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Bargaining problem without minimum wage
In this section, we will see a Nash bargaining problem proposed by Gupta
(2000). There are two players (the employer and the guardian of the child
worker) in the bargaining game. Let w be the wage of the child worker. Part of
the wage, t, is used for the provision of meal to the child. Assume 0 ≤ t ≤ w.3
The rest of the wage payment w− t is transferred to the guardian. We assume
that the amount of meal consumption determines child labor output under
the production function f(t), which is increasing and concave, that is, f ′ > 0,
f ′′ < 0.
2See Basu (1999) and Krueger and Donohue (2005).
3Gupta(2000) notated t as λw, where λ is the fraction of the wage given to the child
worker and 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0.
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Given w and t, the employer’s profit, E, is given by E = f(t) − w.4 The
income of the guardian, G, is given by G = w − t. If the employer and
the guardian do not reach an agreement, they earn zero payoff, that is, the
disagreement point is (EN , GN ) = (0, 0).
The employer and the guardian need to reach an agreement on w and t,
through bargaining. Their feasible set, F , is the set of (E,G) that can be
realized by a pair (w, t) such that E = f(t)− w and G = w − t;
F = {(E,G) |E = f(t)− w, G = w − t, E ≥ 0, G ≥ 0} .
Individual rationality requires that E ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, which is f(t) ≥ w ≥ t ≥
0. Then, we also define the bargaining set, B, the efficient subset of F , as the




∣∣∣@(E′, G′) ∈ F s.t. (E′, G′) 6= (E,G), E′ ≥ E and G′ ≥ G} .
We can obtain B by maximizing the joint payoff E +G = f(t)− t, which
drives t to be equal to t∗ satisfying f ′(t∗) = 1.5 Then, the bargaining set is
the set of pairs (E,G) satisfying E +G = f(t∗)− t∗, that is,
B = {(E,G) ∈ F |E +G = f(t∗)− t∗, E ≥ 0, G ≥ 0} .
Therefore, the bargaining set is the line which slope is −1 and the bargain-
ing game is symmetric. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
4We assume output price is given by 1.
5Assume that f(t∗)− t∗ ≥ 0.
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E = f(t)− w






Figure 2.1: The bargaining set without minimum wage
2.2 Bargaining problem with minimum wage
Gupta(2000) introduced two variations of this model. The first variation is the
imposition of the minimum wage and the other variation is the introduction
of the adult labor market. In this paper, we will only look at the first case.
Let the minimum wage be w̄, that is, w ≥ w̄. Then, we should redefine
the feasible set, F(w̄), as follows,
F(w̄) = {(E,G) |E = f(t)− w, G = w − t, 0 ≤ t ≤ w ≤ f(t), w ≥ w̄} .
When w is less than or equal to t∗, E +G = f(t)− t is less than or equal
to f(t∗)− t∗ because t∗ ≥ w ≥ t and f ′(t∗) = 1. Therefore, the imposition of
w̄ ≤ t∗ does not affect the bargaining set, i.e., B(w̄) = B.6
When we impose w̄ > t∗, for any w̄ > t ≥ t∗ and sufficiently small ε > 0,
(f(t) − w̄ + ε, w̄ − ε − t) is no longer in the feasible set, so the feasible set
6For a pair (E,G), which is realized by w < w̄ and 0 ≤ t ≤ w, there may or may not
exists w′ ≥ w̄ and 0 ≤ t′ ≤ w′ realizing (E,G). If there does not exist such (w′, t′), the
bargaining set shrinks. However, even in this case, if w̄ ≤ t∗, the frontier remains same and
the deleted area does not play a critical role.
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E = f(t)− w








(f(t)− w̄ + ǫ, w̄ − ǫ− t)
(Ed, Gd)
Figure 2.2: The bargaining set with minimum wage
reduces.7 B(w̄), the bargaining set, is composed of two parts - a line part,
Bl(w̄), and a curve part, Bc(w̄), i.e.,
B(w̄) = Bl(w̄) ∪ Bc(w̄).
Bl(w̄) is the set of pairs (E,G) of which the sum is equal to f(t∗)− t∗, i.e.,
Bl(w̄) = {(E,G) ∈ F |E +G = f(t∗)− t∗, f(t) ≥ w ≥ w̄} .
Bc(w̄) is the set of pairs (E,G) that is realized by w̄ and t ≥ t∗, i.e.,
Bc(w̄) = {(E,G) ∈ F |w = w̄ and w ≥ t ≥ t∗} .
In the line part, t is fixed to t∗ and w varies on [w̄, f(t)]. On the other
7If there exists (w′, t′) realizing (f(t) − w̄ + ε, w̄ − ε − t), f(t′) − t′ = f(t) − t should be
satisfied. From this, t′ is equal to t or t∗ > t′. If t′ = t, w′ is equal to w̄−ε, which is less than
the minimum wage, w̄. If t∗ > t′, f(t′)−w′ = f(t)− w̄+ ε, so that w′ = w̄+ f(t′)− f(t)− ε,
which is less than the minimum wage, w̄, since t ≥ t∗ > t′. Therefore, (f(t)−w̄+ε, w̄−ε−t)
is not in the bargaining set anymore.
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hand, in the curve part, w is fixed to w̄ and t varies on [t∗, w̄] . We consider
(Ed, Gd), which is realized by w̄ and t∗, i.e.,
(Ed, Gd) = (f(t∗)− w̄, w̄ − t∗).
We will call this point ‘the division point’, since this point divides Bl(w̄)
and Bc(w̄). Moreover, (Ed, Gd) is the only element that belongs to the inter-
section of Bl(w̄) and Bc(w̄). This is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
3 Nash Solution
Nash(1950) proposed a bargaining problem and the solution concept of this
problem. Nash solution maximizes the product of two individuals’ payoffs and
this solution is the unique solution satisfying two axioms - independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA) and scale independence. Independence of irrelevant
alternatives axiom characterizes that the reduction of the feasible set does not
change the solution of the bargaining problem if the solution still remains in
the reduced feasible set.
In this section, we will look at the Nash solution of the bargaining problem
suggested in the previous section. The results of this section is mainly referred
from Gupta(2000).
3.1 Nash solution of the bargaining problem without mini-
mum wage
As mentioned in the previous section, the bargaining problem without mini-
mum wage is symmetric and this induces equal payoffs for the employer and
the guardian in Nash bargaining solution. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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E = f(t)− w




(f(t∗)− w∗, w∗ − t∗)
Figure 3.1: Nash solution in the bargaining game without minimum wage












This result is consistent with McDonald and Solow(1981)’s condition of
wage determination in the bargaining model in the sense that the effective
cost (w
∗
t∗ ) is equal to the mean of the average productivity (
f(t∗)
t∗ ) and the
marginal productivity (1 = f ′(t∗)).
3.2 Nash solution of the bargaining problem with minimum
wage imposition
3.2.1 When 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ w∗
If we introduce minimum wage constraint, w ≥ w̄, the feasible set reduces by
eliminating the subset of the feasible set that can only be obtained by agreeing
with the wage below w̄. Reduction of the feasible set reminds us of the IIA
axiom. When the minimum wage is less than or equal to w∗, the original
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E = f(t)− w
G = w − t
f(t∗)− t∗
f(w̄)− w̄
w̄ − f−1(w̄) (f(t∗)− wN , wN − t∗)
O
Figure 3.2: Nash solution in the bargaining game with minimum wage w̄ ≤ w∗
game’s Nash solution (E∗, G∗) is still in the feasible set so that the modified
game’s Nash solution (EN , GN ) is equal to (E∗, G∗) and the equilibrium wage
wN is equal to w∗. Figure 3.2 shows this case. This result implies that the
minimum wage policy does not influence the Nash solution at all.
3.2.2 When w∗ < w̄
When the minimum wage is above w∗, IIA axiom does not play any role since
(E∗, G∗) is no longer in the feasible set. In order to obtain the Nash solution
in this case, E and G will solve
(wN , tN ) = arg max
w≥w̄
w≥t≥0
(f(t)− w)(w − t).
Note that Nash solution is on the bargaining set. Thus, it is on either
Bl(w̄) or Bc(w̄). When w̄ > w∗, the point on Bl(w̄) that maximizes E ·G is the
division point (Ed, Gd), the intersection of Bl(w̄) and Bc(w̄). This implies that
Nash solution is on Bc(w̄). We can see this from Figure 3.3. Since w is fixed
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E = f(t)− w




(f(tN)− w̄, w̄ − tN)
O
Figure 3.3: Nash solution in the bargaining game with minimum wage w̄ > w∗




(f(t)− w̄)(w̄ − t).




f ′(t) + f(t)t
f ′(t) + 1
. (3.2)
This equation implies that the effective cost ( w̄t ) is equal to
MP+AP
MP+1 . In
order to solve t in terms of w̄, let us define a function g(t) as follows;
g(t) =
f(t) + t · f ′(t)
f ′(t) + 1
.
Then, by differentiating g, we can derive that g is an increasing function as
long as f(t) ≥ t, which is true from the assumption f(t) ≥ w ≥ t. Thus, the
inverse function of g exists and we can get the optimal tN as follows;
tN = g−1(w̄). (3.3)
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Since g(t∗) is equal to w∗, the optimal tN is greater than t∗. Moreover,
because g is increasing, the optimal tN increases as w̄ increases. The joint
income of the employer and the guardian E +G is f(tN )− tN and it declines
as tN increases since f ′(tN ) < 1 from tN > t∗. Employer’s payoff is EN =
f(tN )− w̄ and this can be written as EN = f(tN )− g(tN ). By differentiating
EN once with respect to tN and using f ′(tN ) < 1, we can derive that the
employer’s payoff decreases as tN increases.8 These results imply that as the
wage bound w̄ rises the joint income and the employer’s payoff become smaller.
Guardian’s payoff is GN = w̄ − tN = g(tN )− tN and increases only when
g′(tN ) > 1, which is equivalent to f ′2 + (tN − f) · f ′′ > 1. The inequality is
satisfied around t∗ since f ′(t∗) = 1 and (t−f)·f ′′ > 0. However, the inequality
may not be satisfied as tN increases, and this induces the guardian’s payoff to
decrease. The following proposition summarize preceding results.
Proposition 1. When the minimum wage w̄ is imposed on the child labor bar-
gaining model and the solution type of the bargaining game is Nash bargaining
solution,
1. if 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ w∗, then wN = w∗ and tN = t∗, and thus everything remains
the same as w̄ varies.
2. if w∗ < w̄, then wN = w̄ and tN = g−1(w̄). As w̄ increases, wage (w)
and meal provided to the child worker (t) increase and the employer’s
payoff (E) and the sum of two indiviiduals’ payoffs (E + G) decrease.
Guardian’s payoff increases near w∗, however it may decrease as w̄ be-
comes larger.
8By differentiating EN by tN , dE
N
dt
= f ′ − 2f
′2+2f ′+(t−f)f ′′
(f ′+1)2 =
f ′3−f ′−(t−f)f ′′
(f ′+1)2 < 0.
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where g(t) = f(t)+t·f
′(t)
f ′(t)+1 .
4 Kalai Smorodinsky Solution
Although Nash solution is a representative solution of the bargaining problem,
it is not a unique solution. As McDonald and Solow (1981) have pointed
out, IIA axiom has been much criticized. Many researchers believed that the
deleted alternatives may be concerned with determining the bargaining power
of a player, since the notion of “bargaining power” may include what one can
do alternatively.
As an alternative of IIA axiom, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) introduced
monotonicity axiom, which is based on this philosophy. The monotonicity
axiom says that as the maximum of the player’s possible utility increases,
the player should be paid more. Kalai Smorodinsky solution is the unique
solution that satisfies the monotonicity axiom, pareto optimality, symmetry,
and the invariance with respect to affine transformations. In their solution,
the bargaining power of each player is determined by the maximum of the
player’s possible utility. In practice, when the employer’s maximum payoff is
Ê and that of the guardian is Ĝ, we draw a line connecting the disagreement
point (0, 0) and (Ê, Ĝ). Hereafter we will call this line ‘the ratio line’. Kalai
Smorodinsky solution is the intersection of this line and the bargaining set.
4.1 Kalai Smorodinsky solution of the bargaining problem with-
out minimum wage
We will solve Gupta’s bargaining problem by using Kalai and Smorodinsky
solution concept and compare this with the Nash solution. Now, let us de-
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E = f(t)− w
G = w − t
f(t∗)− t∗
f(t∗)− t∗
(f(t∗)− w∗, w∗ − t∗)
O
(Ê, Ĝ)
Figure 4.1: Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution in the bargaining
game without minimum wage.
rive the Kalai Smorodinsky solution of the bargaining problem in section 2.
Since the bargaining game is symmetric, Kalai Smorodinsky solution gives the
employer and the guardian same payoffs and is equal to the Nash solution.
Therefore, (E∗, G∗) is Kalai Smorodinsky solution and w∗is the equilibrium
wage. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Kalai Smorodinsky solution of the bargaining problem with
minimum wage
When the minimum wage is imposed, in order to get Kalai Smorodinsky solu-
tion, the range of w̄ should be partitioned into three parts. When w̄ is small
enough, the imposition of minimum wage would not affect the feasible set, so
that Kalai Smorodinsky solution remains the same. When w̄ is in the inter-
mediate part, Kalai Smorodinsky solution lies on Bl(w̄), the line part of the
bargaining set. When w̄ is large enough, Kalai Smorodinsky solution lies on
Bc(w̄), the curve part of the bargaing set.
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4.2.1 When 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ t∗
When w is less than or equal to t∗, we know that the imposition of w̄ less
than or equal to t∗ does not affect the feasible set. Indeed, wKS , the wage of
Kalai Smorodinsky solution with minimum wage w̄ ≤ t∗ is equal to w∗, the
wage of the bargaining game’s solution without minimum wage. tKS , the meal
provision of Kalai Smorodinsky solution with minimum wage w̄ ≤ t∗ is equal
to t∗, the meal provision of the bargaining game’s solution without minimum
wage. Since the wage and the meal provision do not vary in this range, the
payoff of the employer and the guardian and the sum of both individual’s
payoffs are also fixed.
4.2.2 When t∗ < w̄ ≤ ŵ9
When we impose w̄ > t∗, the feasible set reduces and Kalai Smorodinsky solu-
tion is not equal to (E∗, G∗) anymore. The closed form of Kalai Smorodinsky
solution would vary according to the location of the division point with re-
spect to the ratio line. If the division point is below the ratio line, Kalai
Smorodinsky solution is on Bl(w̄), the line part of the bargaining set. On the
other hand, if the division point is above the ratio line, Kalai Smorodinsky
solution is on Bc(w̄), the curve part of the bargaining set. Therefore, finding
the cutoff level of w̄, which makes the division point to be on the ratio line,
is essential in order to derive the closed form of Kalai Smorodinsky solution.







f(ŵ)− ŵ . (4.1)
9ŵ is defined on 4.1.
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For notational convenience, let h(x) = f(x)− x. Then, h is decreasing on






When ŵ = t∗, the left hand side of the equation is equal to 0. When ŵ
is close to f(t∗), the left hand side of this equation goes to infinity due to
the term h(t
∗)








. This is positive on ŵ ∈ (t∗, f(t∗)). Thus, the
left hand side of the equation is continuous and increasing with respect to ŵ
on (t∗, f(t∗)), and there exists the unique ŵ satisfying (4.2) on (t∗, f(t∗)) by
the intermediate value theorem.
By using the fact that the right hand side of (4.1) is greater than 1, since
t∗ maximizes h(t), and w
∗−t∗




f(t∗)−w∗ . From this we
get
ŵ > w∗. (4.3)
Now we return to Kalai Smorodinsky solution. When t∗ < w̄ ≤ ŵ, as we
can see in Figure 4.2, Kalai Smorodinsky solution would be on Bl(w̄). This
implies that the meal provision tKS of Kalai Smorodinsky solution should be
equal to t∗. From the fact that Kalai Smorodinsky solution is on the ratio









and (4.4) can be transformed to





E = f(t)− w








Figure 4.2: Kalai Smorodinsky solution in the bargaining game with minimum
wage ŵ ≥ w̄ > t∗
As w̄ increases in this range, the transfer tKS is fixed and the wage wKS
increases from (4.5) and h′ < 0. Therefore, E + G = f(tKS) − tKS is fixed,
E = f(tKS)− wKS decreases and G = wKS − tKS increases.
4.2.3 When ŵ < w̄ ≤ f(t∗)
When ŵ < w̄ ≤ f(t∗), as we can see in Figure 4.3, Kalai Smorodinsky solution
would be on Bc(w̄). This implies that the wage wKS of Kalai Smorodinsky
solution should be equal to w̄. From the fact that Kalai Smorodinsky solution









For convenience, let us define kw̄(t) =
w̄−t
f(t)−w̄ , which is decreasing with
respect to t on (f−1(w̄), w̄). Then k−1w̄ exists on (f
−1(w̄), w̄) and by using the
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E = f(t)− w





(f(tKS)− w̄, w̄ − tKS)
(Ed, Gd)
(Ê, Ĝ)
Figure 4.3: Kalai Smorodinsky solution in the bargaining game with minimum
wage f(t∗) ≥ w̄ > ŵ







As w̄ increases in this range, the wage wKS increases since it is equal to
w̄. From (4.7), we know that kw̄(t
KS) = h(t
∗)
h(w̄) and by differentiating this with
respect to w̄ we get
∂kw̄
∂t






We can simply derive that ∂kw̄∂t < 0 and with some manipulation we also
can get −∂kw̄∂w̄ −
h(t∗)
h(w̄)2
· h′(w̄) < 0. From this, we can get t′ > 0.10 Thus, in
this case, the meal provided to the child worker increases. Therefore, E+G =
f(tKS) − tKS decreases and E = f(tKS) − wKS decreases as w̄ increases.
10From the definition of kw̄ and h , − ∂kw̄∂w̄ −
h(t∗)
h(w̄)2












. It is negative
because −h(t∗)2 + h(t) · h(t∗) ≤ 0 from t ≥ t∗.
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E = f(t)− w
G = w − t
f(w̄)− w̄
w̄ − f−1(w̄)
(f(tKS)− w̄, w̄ − tKS)
O
(Ê, Ĝ)
Figure 4.4: Kalai Smorodinsky solution in the bargaining game with minimum
wage f(t∗) ≥ w̄ > ŵ
However, the movement of G = wKS − tKS with respect to increasing w̄ is
ambiguous; G increases if and only if t′ from (4.8) is smaller than 1.
4.2.4 When f(t∗) < w̄
When f(t∗) < w̄, as we can see in figure 4.4, the line part of the bargaining set
does not exist anymore. Then the wage wKS of Kalai Smorodinsky solution
should be equal to w̄ since Kalai Smorodinsky solution would be on Bc(w̄).
Moreover, the maximum payoff that the guardian obtains would decrease to
















and t′ > 0. (4.10)
11By the individual rationality of the employer, f(t) − w̄ ≥ 0, so that t ≥ f−1(w̄) > t∗.
Therefore, the maximum payoff of the guardian is w̄ − f−1(w̄).
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Therefore, as w̄ increases, E + G and E also decrease in this case, and G
is still ambiguous and increases if and only if t′ < 1.
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 2. When the minimum wage w̄ is imposed on the child labor bar-
gaining model and the solution type of the bargaining game is Kalai Smorodin-
sky solution,
1. if 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ t∗, wKS = w∗ and tKS = t∗, so that everything remains same
as w̄ varies.
2. if t∗ < w̄ ≤ ŵ, wKS = t∗ + h(t∗)2h(w̄)+h(t∗) and tKS = t∗.
As w̄ increases, only the wage of the child worker increases and the
meal provision is fixed. The sum of two individual’s payoffs is fixed, the
employer’s payoff decreases and the guardian’s payoff increases.






As w̄ increases, the wage of the child worker and the meal provision
increase. Employer’s payoff and the sum of two individual’s payoffs
decrease. Guardian’s payoff is ambiguous and increases if and only if
∂tKS
∂w̄ < 1.






As w̄ increases, the wage of the child worker and the meal provision
increase. Employer’s payoff and the sum of two individual’s payoffs
decrease. Guardian’s payoff is ambiguous and increases if and only if
∂tKS
∂w̄ < 1.
where h(x) = f(x)− x, ŵ satisfying h(t∗)ŵ−t∗ −
h(t∗)




4.3 Comparison with Nash solution
We have solved the bargaining problem by using Nash solution and Kalai
Smorodinsky solution. In this section, we will compare these two solutions.
As we can see in the preceding sections, the results may differ by the range of
w̄. The following proposition summarizes the results and proof is provided in
appendix.
Proposition 3. When the minimum wage w̄ is imposed on the child labor
bargaining model,
1. When 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ t∗,
the wages, the meal provisions, the employer’s profit, the guardian’s pay-
off, and the sums of each player’s payoff of both solutions are equal to
w∗, t∗, 12(f(t
∗)− t∗), 12(f(t∗)− t∗), and f(t∗)− t∗ respectively.
2. When t∗ ≤ w̄ ≤ w∗,
the wage, w, and the guardian’s payoff, G, of Kalai Smorodinsky solution
are greater than those of Nash solution,
and the employer’s profit, E, of Kalai Smorodinsky solution is less than
that of Nash solution,
and the meal provision, t, and the sum of each player’s payoff, E + G,
of Kalai Smorodinsky solution are equal to those of Nash solution.
3. When w∗ < w̄ < ŵ,
the wage, w, and the guardian’s payoff, G, and the sum of each player’s
payoff, E + G, of Kalai Smorodinsky solution are greater than those of
Nash solution,
and the employer’s profit, E, and the meal provision, t, of Kalai Smorodin-
sky solution are less than that of Nash solution,
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4. When ŵ ≤ w̄,
the wages, w, of both solutions are equal to w̄,
however, the other variables are ambiguous to compare.
The first part of the proposition shows that the imposition of small mini-
mum wage does not affect each solution and both solutions induce same payoff
to the guardian and the employer.
When t∗ ≤ w̄ ≤ w∗, which is the condition of the second part of the
proposition, Nash solution induces both players to get same payoff, however,
Kalai Smorodinsky solution induces the guardian to get more payoff than the
employer. Since the meal provisions, t, of both solutions are same, the sums of
each player’s payoff are same. This implies that the main difference between
two solutions in this range is how the employer and the guardian divide the
revenue of child labor, but how much they enforce child to produce. Another
implication is that the minimum wage policy affects only Kalai Smorodinsky
solution in this range.
When w∗ < w̄ < ŵ, which is the condition of the third part of the
proposition, the guardian’s payoff and the sum of two players’ payoff of Kalai
Smorodinsky solution are greater than those of Nash solution, on the other
hand, the employer’s payoff of Nash solution is greater than that of Kalai
Smorodinsky solution. This implies that solution type not only affect how two
players divide the revenue of child labor, but also how much they enforce child
to produce.
When ŵ ≤ w̄, which is the condition of the fourth part of the proposition,
wages, w, of both solutions are equal to w̄. Which solution’s meal provision,
t, is greater than the other’s varies according to the form of f . Therefore, it
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is also ambiguous that which solution gives more payoff to the employer and
the guardian respectively.
Based on these results we know that Kalai Smorodinsky solution gives
more or equal payoff to the guardian than Nash solution gives when the gov-
ernment imposes w̄ < ŵ. This implies that Kalai Smorodinsky solution is
more favorable to the guardian than Nash solution in this range. However,
when ŵ ≤ w̄, it is ambiguous that which solution is more favorable to the
guardian.
5 Bargaining model with an altruistic guardian
Gupta (2000) has assumed that the guardian does not care about the child’s
welfare. This is contrary to recent studies, which consider the guardian’s
altruism.12 Basu and Van (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000), the most
influential theoretic papers in child labor analysis, are founded on the parent’s
altruistic concern about the child’s welfare. In this section, we will adapt the
guardian’s altruism towards the child to Gupta (2000)’s bargaining model.
The first step of modifying the model is reconsidering the role of the meal
provision t. In Gupta (2000)’s model, the variable t plays two roles - one is
the guardian’s transfer towards the child worker and the other is the factor of
production. In the new model, we will separate these two roles and use two
variables corresponding to each role. This feature is important to analyze the
child’s welfare. The two roles that we have mentioned work oppositely to the
child’s welfare in a sense that the increase of the guardian’s transfer towards
the child is positive and the increase of labor supply as a factor of production
12Basu (1999) has describe that the child in Gupta (2000)’s model is valued in the same
way as the goose that lays the golden eggs.
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is negative to the child worker. Thus, when we consider the child’s welfare, it
is impossible to treat the two roles as one variable.
The second step is to introduce the guardian’s income. Basu and Van
(1998) assume luxury axiom which implies that the guardian sends his child
out to work if and only if the income from non-child labor sources drops low.
This can be viewed as a selective altruism towards the child. In Gupta (2000)’s
model, we do not have the opportunity to consider non-child labor income and
even if we introduce the guardian’s income in the model, the effect would just
be shifting up to the disagreement point and the feasible set. However, in the
new model, since we have separated the guardian’s transfer from the factor
of production in the first step, the introduction of the guardian’s income may
influence the disagreement point and the shape of the feasible set. In the next
section, we will introduce the new model considering these two features.
5.1 Bargaining model
We consider a bargaining problem of the employer and the guardian as in
section 2. We introduce the child labor level l ∈ [0, L], and production function
f(l) with f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0, and cost function for child worker c(l) with
c′ > 0. We are assuming that f ′(0)− c′(0) > 0 and f ′′ − c′′ < 0, so that there
exists l0 ∈ (0, L] maximizing f(l) − c(l).13 Moreover, we are assuming that
f(l0)−c(l0) < 0.14 This assumption implies that child labor will never occur if
the players of bargaining game are the employer and child worker.15 However,
13From f ′(0) − c′(0) > 0 and f ′′ − c′′ < 0, l0 satisfies either f ′(l0) = c′(l0) or l0 = L and
f ′(L)− c′(L) > 0.
14Here, we assume that c(0) > 0, which is the fixed cost of child labor.
15When the wage is w, the employer’s profit is f(l)− w and child’s payoff is w − c(l) and
the disagreement point is (EN , GN ) = (0, 0). They will not cooperate since the sum of each
player’s payoff at disagreement point is greater that of cooperative situation.
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our model considers a bargaining game of the employer and the guardian and
this feature drives child worker to work.
In section 2, the employer and the guardian make a contract on w and
t, and in this model, the employer and the guardian make a contract on w
and l. When the wage is w and the labor level is l, the employer’s profit is
E = f(l)−w and the guardian receives all the wage of the child worker. Then,
the guardian decides how much transfer he would give to his child and let us
call this amount b. We also assume that guardians already have their own
income and we call it A and assume that A ≥ 0. Then, b should be constrained
to 0 ≤ b ≤ A + w. In contrast to the model in section 2, the guardian cares
about the utility of his child and assumes that the child’s utility is decided by
b and l. In this paper, we simply assume that the child’s utility is separable, so
that u(b, l) = v(b)− c(l).16 Here we assume that v(0) = 0, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0, and
there exists b0 such that v
′(b0) = 1 and it satisfies v(b0)−b0 > 0. By summing
up all the preceding features, the guardian’s payoff is G = A+w−b+v(b)−c(l).
The payoff of the employer at the disagreement point, EN , is always fixed
to 0. However, the payoff of the guardian at the disagreement point, GN ,
varies with respect to A. Moreover, whether A ≥ b0 or A < b0 would affect
the representation of the disagreement point.
A ≥ b0 means that the guardian has enough money to give his child the
optimal transfer b0. At the disagreement point, the guardian will choose the
optimal b∗, which maximizes his payoff subject to w = 0 and l = 0. Since
0 ≤ b ≤ A and A ≥ b0, the optimal b∗ is equal to b0. Therefore, when A ≥ b0,
the disagreement point is (EN , GN ) = (0, A− b0 + v(b0)).
A < b0 means that the guardian does not have enough money to give his
16More precisely, u is the guardian’s altruistic utility toward child.
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child the optimal transfer b0. In this case, from 0 ≤ b ≤ A < b0, the optimal
b∗, for deciding the disagreement point, is equal to A. Then, the disagreement
point is (EN , GN ) = (0, v(A)).
5.2 Child labor supply
In this bargaining model, child labor is supplied if and only if the sum of the
payoffs of the employer and the guardian in an agreement point is greater than
that in the disagreement point, i.e.,
E +G > EN +GN .
We will consider two cases as in the preceding section.
5.2.1 When b0 ≤ A
When A ≥ b0, the following inequality implies that guardian’s payoff at the
disagreement point is greater than guardian’s payoff at any agreement point.
child labor does not occur at all in this case.
A− b0 + v(b0) > A− b+ v(b) + f(l0)− c(l0) ≥ A+ w − b+ v(b)− c(l).
This result implies that child labor does not occur at all when the guardian
has enough money to give his child the optimal transfer b0. This is consistent
with Basu and Van (1998)’s Luxury axiom. Moreover, it is also similar to
Baland and Robinson (2000). They demonstrated that child labor level is
efficiently high when the capital market is perfect and parents leave positive
bequests to their child. However the child labor level may be inefficiently high
when the family is so poor that parents cannot leave bequests to their child.
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5.2.2 When 0 ≤ A < b0
When 0 ≤ A < b0, since (EN , GN ) = (0, v(A)), child labor is supplied when
E +G > v(A).
Therefore, we need to check whether the maximized E+G is greater than
v(A) or not. The maximization problem of E +G is
max (f(l)− w) + (A+ w − b+ v(b)− c(l)) ,
subject to 0 ≤ l ≤ L, 0 ≤ w ≤ f(l), 0 ≤ b ≤ A+ w.
In order to maximize f(l) − c(l), l should be equal to l0. Since w is
canceled out, w does not directly affect to the maximization process, but
influence indirectly by forming the constraint of b, so that w = f(l0) is optimal.
Therefore, the maximization problem turns to max0≤b≤A+f(l0) (−b+ v(b)) +
(A+ f(l0)− c(l0)). In order to obtain optimal b, we should consider two cases.
For notational convenience, let us define g = f(l0)− b0 + v(b0)− c(l0).
Case A. f(l0) +A ≥ b0
In this case, the optimal b∗ is b0. Then, child labor is supplied only when
A+ g > v(A),
which is equivalent to
ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ b0 − f(l0),
where ṽ(x) = v(x)− x, which is increasing on A ∈ [0, b0].
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Case B. b0 > f(l0) +A
In this case, the optimal b∗ is f(l0) +A. Then, child labor is supplied only
when
v(f(l0) +A)− c(l0) > v(A),
which is equivalent to
min
{
b0 − f(l0), v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0))
}
> A,
where v̄k(x) = v(k + x)− v(x), which is decreasing.
The following proposition summarizes the preceding results.
Proposition 4. When the employer and the guardian play the child labor
bargaining model with an altruistic guardian,
1. When f(l0) ≥ b0, child labor is supplied if and only if ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ 0.
2. When b0 > f(l0),
(a) if c(l0) ≥ v(b0)− v(b0 − f(l0)), child labor is supplied if and only if
v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) > A ≥ 0.
(b) if c(l0) < v(b0)− v(b0 − f(l0)), child labor is supplied if and only if
ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ 0.
Proof. When f(l0) ≥ b0, for all A ≥ 0, f(l0) + A ≥ b0. Therefore, only case
1 happens in this extent. We can derive that ṽ−1 (g) ≥ v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) > 0 ≥
b0 − f(l0) and this implies that when ṽ−1 (g) ≥ A ≥ 0 child labor occurs and
when A > ṽ−1(g) child labor never occurs.
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When b0 > f(l0), if c(l0) ≥ v(b0) − v(b0 − f(l0)), we can show that b0 −
f(l0) ≥ ṽ−1 (g) ≥ v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) . From this, we know that child labor never
occurs in case 1 since A > b0 − f(l0) implies A > ṽ−1(g). Child labor can
occur only in case 2. From this, we obtain that child labor is supplied if and
only if v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) > A ≥ 0.
If c(l0) < v(b0) − v(b0 − f(l0)), we can derive ṽ−1 (g) ≥ v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) >
b0 − f(l0). When ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ b0 − f(l0), it belongs to case 1 and child
labor occurs. When v̄−1f(l0) (c(l0)) > A ≥ 0, it belongs to case 2 and child labor
occurs. From this, we can obtain that child labor is supplied if and only if
ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ 0.
This proposition leads us to the luxury axiom in the sense that there exists
a subsistence level such that child labor is supplied if and only if guardian’s
income is less than that level. In Basu and Van (1998), the luxury axiom
operates as an axiom imposed on parental preference and the subsistence level
is given exogenously. On the other hand, in this model, we get the luxury
axiom as a result of analysis. Moreover, if we know function f , v, and c, we
can get the subsistence level endogenously.
There are several empirical findings that support the luxury axiom. Bhalo-
tra (2007) has shown that poverty forces child, especially a boy, to work from
household survey for Pakistan. Edmonds and Schady (forthcoming) have ran-
domly selected poor women with children in Ecuador for a cash transfer. They
found that poor families with children in school at the time of the award use
the extra income to postpone the child’s entry into the labor force.
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5.3 The feasible set and bargaining set of the bargaining prob-
lem
In this section, we will look into the bargaining game defined on the previous
section more precisely. The employer and the guardian need to reach an
agreement on w and l, through bargaining and the guardian chooses optimal b
maximizing his utility. Individual rationality requires that E ≥ 0 and G ≥ 0.






G≥v(A), 0≤l≤L, 0≤w≤f(l), 0≤b≤A+w
}
We also define the bargaining set, B(A) as in section 2. From E + G =
A + f(l) − c(l) − b + v(b), l maximizes f(l) − c(l) and b maximizes v(b) − b,








Due to b = min {b0, A+ w}, B(A) is divided into two parts - Bl(A), of
which b is equal to b0 and b0 −A ≤ w ≤ f(l0), and Bc(A), of which b is equal
to A+w and 0 ≤ w ≤ b0−A. the shape of B(A) varies according to the range























Figure 5.1: The bargaining set when ṽ−1 (g) > A > v−1(G0)
We can easily see that Bl(A) is a segment and we call this a line part of
the bargaining set and Bc(A) is a curve and we call this a curve part of the
bargaining set.
For notational convenience, let us define G0 = v(b0)−c(l0), G1(A) = A+g,
and G2(A) = v(A + f(l0)) − c(l0), where g = f(l0) − b0 + v(b0) − c(l0). Also
define E0(A) = A+ f(l0)− b0, E1(A) = −v(A) +A+ g, E2(A) = A+ f(l0)−
v−1(v(A) + c(l0)). Then, these values play an important role in analyzing the
bargaining set of the game and we can see this from figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. For
example, we can see that (E0, G0) is realized by w = b0 − A, l = l0, and
b = b0, so that (E0, G0) would be the division point of the bargaining set.
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According to the range A belongs to, the shape of B(A) would vary. Now we
will consider three ranges where A can belong to.
Case 1. When ṽ−1 (g) > A > v−1(G0)
In this case, v(A) > v(b0)− c(l0) ≥ v(A+w)− c(l0) for all 0 ≤ w ≤ b0−A,
18Due to the constraint G ≥ v(A), there would be some cases that (E0, G0) is not in the
frontier of the bargaining set. Except for those cases, (E0, G0) is the division point of the










Figure 5.2: The bargaining set when v−1(G0) ≥ A ≥ b0 − f(l0)
and this implies that the bargaining set is only composed of the line part, i.e.,
B(A) = Bl(A) and Bc(A) = ∅. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Case 2. When v−1(G0) ≥ A ≥ b0 − f(l0)
In this case, v−1(G0) ≥ A implies that Bc(A) 6= ∅ and A ≥ b0 − f(l0)
implies that Bl(A) 6= ∅. This means that the bargaining set is composed of
both the line part, Bl(A), and the curve part, Bc(A). This is illustrated in
Figure 5.2.
Case 3. When b0 − f(l0) > A ≥ 0
In this case, b0 > A+ f(l0) ≥ A+w for all 0 ≤ w ≤ f(l0), and this implies
that the bargaining set is only composed of the curve part, i.e., B(A) = Bc(A)
and Bl(A) = ∅. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
According to f , c, and v, the realized feasible set can vary. When f(l0) ≥










Figure 5.3: The bargaining set when b0 − f(l0) > A ≥ 0
case 2 may happen since 0 ≥ b0 − f(l0) in this case. When f(l0) < b0 and
c(l0) ≥ v(b0) − v(b0 − f(l0)), the condition of 2-(a) part of proposition 4, are
satisfied, only case 3 can happen since b0− f(l0) ≥ ṽ−1 (g) in this case. When
f(l0) < b0 and c(l0) < v(b0) − v(b0 − f(l0)), the condition of 2-(b) part of
proposition 4, is satisfied, all cases may arise.
6 The solutions of the bargaining model with an
altruistic guardian
In this section, we will solve the bargaining problem with an altruistic guardian
by using Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution. No matter which
solution we use, the bargaining solution is on the bargaining set. Therefore,
the child labor level of every bargaining solution is equal to l0. This means that
the child labor level is the same for all households that supply child labor.19
19In reality, the child labor level seems to decrease as household’s income increases. This is
true when we consider child worker’s domestic work. However, in this paper, we are focusing
on the market work that the employer and the guardian bargain.
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6.1 Nash solution
In this section, we will solve the bargaining problem with an altruistic guardian
by using Nash solution. The range of A is partitioned into two parts. Let Ã
satisfy v(Ã)+G1(Ã)2 = G0. Whether the guardian’s income, A, is greater than
Ã or not makes a difference in solving the problem.








belongs to the bargaining set, B(A). Then,
we consider a set, B′(A), which is a convex hull of (0, G1(A)), (0, v(A)),
(E1(A), v(A)). Then, B′(A) is the symmetric bargaining set and the Nash so-

































From this and v′(A) > 1 in this range, we can derive that the guardian’s
payoff, GN , and the wage, wN , increases and the employer’s payoff, EN , de-
creases as A increases. The sum of each individuals’ payoff, EN +GN , is equal
to G1(A), which is increasing with respect to A.








is not in the bargaining set B(A) anymore,
and Nash bargaining solution is not on the line part of the bargaining set,
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Bl(A), but on the curve part of the bargaining set, Bc(A). Then, w of Nash
solution solves
wN = arg max
0≤w≤b0−A
(f(l0)− w) · (v(A+ w)− c(l0)) .
The first order condition of w induces that
c(l0) = v(A+ w
N )− (f(l0)− wN ) · v′(A+ wN ).
Let us define gA(w) = v(A+w)− (f(l0)−w) ·v′(A+w). By differentiating
gA(w) by A and w, respectively, we can get
∂gA(w)
∂A = v
′(A+ w)− (f(l0)− w) · v′′(A+ w),
∂gA(w)
∂w = 2v
′(A+ w)− (f(l0)− w) · v′′(A+ w),
which implies that gA(w) is an increasing function with respect to A and w.
Therefore, we can get wN = g−1A (c(l0)) and E and G of Nash bargaining
solution are EN = f(l0)− wN and GN = v(A+ wN )− c(l0).
From gA(w











Thus wN decreases as A increases and ∂w
N














, EN and GN increases as A increases and
E +G also increases.
The following proposition summarizes the result of this section.
Proposition 5. When the solution type of the bargaining problem with an
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altruistic guardian is Nash solution,
1. When 0 ≤ A < Ã,
wN = g−1A (c(l0)), G
N = v(A+ wN )− c(l0) and EN = f(l0)− wN .
As the guardian’s income A increases, the wage, wN , decreases, and the
guardian’s payoff, GN , the employer’s payoff, EN , and the sum of each
individual’s payoff, EN + GN , increase. This implies that the subsidy
policy in this range may induce Pareto improvement.
2. When Ã ≤ A < ṽ−1(g),
wN = f(l0)− E1(A)2 , GN =
G1(A)+v(A)
2 and E
N = E1(A)2 .
As the guardian’s income A increases, the wage, wN , the guardian’s pay-
off, GN , the sum of each individual’s payoff, EN +GN , increase and the
employer’s payoff, EN , decreases.
where gA(w) = v(A+ w)− (f(l0)− w) · v′(A+ w).
Proposition 5 suggests a fresh viewpoint about child labor analysis. The
proposition shows that child labor wage of Nash solution decreases until the
guardian’s income reaches some level. Then it increases as the guardian’s
income exceeds that level. In the first part of proposition 5, under some
level of guardian’s income, the guardian would get smaller additional possible
payoff, and the employer would get more additional possible payoff on the
bargaining game, and this implies that the bargaining power of the guardian
is lessened and that of the employer rises.20 This derives the child labor wage
of Nash bargaining solution to decrease as the guardian’s income increases. On
the other hand, above that level, both the guardian and the employer would
20More precisely, G2(A) − v(A) = v(A + f(l0)) − c(l0) − v(A) decreases and E2(A) − 0
increases as A increases.
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get smaller additional possible payoffs. However, since the employer should
compensate on increased v(A), the guardian’s payoff at the disagreement point,
the child labor wage of Nash bargaining solution increases.21
Let us consider the government’s policy that gives subsidy to the poor
guardian as in Edmonds and Schady (forthcoming). When 0 ≤ A < Ã, from
the first part of the proposition 5, the government’s subsidy to the guardian
may induce Pareto improvement. Since the guardian’s payoff is equal to the
child’s welfare in this case, the definition of Pareto improvement is not con-
strained to the improvement of the employer and the guardian, but includes
the improvement of the child worker. However, when A is above Ã, the sub-
sidy policy is no longer Pareto improving policy. Only the guardian and the
child worker get better off and the employer becomes worse off by the subsidy
policy in this case.
6.2 Kalai Smorodinsky solution
In this section, we will solve the bargaining problem with an altruistic guardian
by using Kalai Smorodinsky solution. The range of A is partitioned into four
parts. When ṽ−1 (g) > A ≥ v−1(G0), the bargaining set is only composed of
the line part. When v−1(G0) > A > b0−f(l0), the bargaining set is composed





when A = Â, the division point is on the ratio line. When A ≥ Â, the solution
is on the line part. On the other hand, when A < Â, the solution is on the
curve part. When b0 − f(l0) ≥ A, the bargaining set is only composed of the
curve part.
21Actually, there exists a range of A such that both the guardian and the employer get
smaller additional possible payoff but the child labor wage increases.
40
6.2.1 When v−1(G0) ≤ A < ṽ−1 (g)
When v−1(G0) ≤ A < ṽ−1 (g), the bargaining problem is symmetric. There-
fore, the employer and the guardian get same additional payoffs, i.e.,
GKS − v(A) = EKS = 1
2
· E1(A).


















As in 6.1.1, GKS , wKS , and EKS + GKS increases and EKS decreases as
A increases.
6.2.2 When Â ≤ A < v−1(G0)
When Â ≤ A < v−1(G0), (EKS , GKS) is the intersection of Bl(A) and the
ratio line. Hence, EKS and GKS satisfies following two equations.
1. EKS +GKS = G1(A), since (E




= G1(A)−v(A)E2(A) , since (E
KS , GKS) is on the ratio line.
From G1(A)− v(A) = E1(A), we can derive that











wKS = f(l0)− EKS .
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Since EKS + GKS = G1(A), the sum of each individuals’ payoff increases
as A increases. With some manipulation, we can show that both E1(A) and






can show that EKS decreases as A increases. Thus, from wKS = f(l0)−EKS ,
wKS increases as A increases. Moreover, since EKS + GKS is increasing and
EKS is decreasing with respect to A, GKS increases as A increases.
6.2.3 When b0 − f(l0) < A < Â
In this case, (EKS , GKS) is on Bc(A). Hence, EKS and GKS satisfies following
equations.





= G1(A)−v(A)E2(A) , since (E
KS , GKS) is on the ratio line.
From these equations, we can derive that
kA(w
KS) = c(l0), (6.1)
where kA(w) = v(A+w)−v(A)−R1(A)·(f(l0)−w) and R1(A) = E1(A)E2(A) . R1(A)
is relative bargaining power of the guardian with respect to the employer in
this range of A.
Since kA(0) < c(l0) < kA(f(l0)) and kA is increasing with respect to w,
there exists wKS ∈ (0, f(l0)) such that wKS = k−1A (c(l0)).




KS increases as A increases if and only if ∂w
KS
∂A < 0. On
the other hand, GKS increases as A increases if and only if ∂w
KS
∂A > −1. By








= v′(A) + (R1(A))
′
(f(l0)− w).







6.2.4 When 0 ≤ A ≤ b0 − f(l0)
In this case, (EKS , GKS) is on Bc(A). Hence, EKS and GKS satisfies following
equations.





= G2(A)−v(A)E2(A) , since (E
KS , GKS) is on the ratio line.
From these equations, we can derive that
lA(w
KS) = c(l0) (6.2)
where lA(w) = v(A+w)−v(A)−R2(A) · (f(l0)−w) and R2(A) = G2(A)−v(A)E2(A) .
R2(A) is relative bargaining power of the guardian with respect to the employer
in this range of A.
Since lA(0) < c(l0) < lA(f(l0)) and lA is increasing, there exists w
KS ∈
(0, f(l0)) such that w
KS = l−1A (c(l0)).



















The following proposition summarizes the result of this section.
Proposition 6. When the solution type of the bargaining problem with an
altruistic guardian is Kalai Smorodinsky solution,
1. When 0 ≤ A ≤ b0 − f(l0),
wKS = l−1A (c(l0)), G
KS = v(A+ wKS)− c(l0) and EKS = f(l0)− wKS,










2. When b0 − f(l0) < A < Â, wKS = k−1A (c(l0)),
GKS = v(A+ wKS)− c(l0), and EKS = f(l0)− wKS,
where kA(w) = v(A+w)−v(A)−R1(A) ·(f(l0)−w) and R1(A) = E1(A)E2(A) .






3. When Â ≤ A < v−1(G0),
GKS = v(A) + E1(A)
2
E1(A)+E2(A)
, EKS = E1(A)·E2(A)E1(A)+E2(A) , and w
KS = f(l0) −
EKS.
4. When v−1(G0) ≤ A < ṽ−1(g),
wKS = f(l0)− E1(A)2 , GKS =
G1(A)+v(A)
2 and E
KS = E1(A)2 .
5. In case of 3 and 4, as the guardian’s income A increases, the wage, wN ,
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the guardian’s payoff, GN , the sum of each individual’s payoff, EN +GN ,
increase and the employer’s payoff, EN , decreases.
6.3 Comparison of Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky so-
lution
In order to compare Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution, it is es-
sential to determine which one of Ã and Â is greater than the other. Since
G0−v(Ã)
E0(Ã)






and this implies that
Ã > Â.
When 0 ≤ A ≤ Â, both Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky solutions are on
Bc(A), the curve part of the bargaining set. Even though we have obtained
the closed form of Kalai Smorodinsky solution in section 6.2, it is not easy to
characterize the solution and compare with Nash solution. As in the last part
of proposition 3, both solutions are on the curve part of the bargaining set
and it is ambiguous to compare the two solutions.
When Â ≤ A ≤ Ã, Nash solution is on Bc(A) and Kalai Smorodinsky
solution is on Bl(A). Thus,
EKS ≤ f(l0)− b0 +A ≤ EN ,
GN ≤ v(b0)− c(l0) ≤ GKS ,
and
wN ≤ b0 −A ≤ wKS .
In each inequality, only one of the equalities can be satisfied. Hence, we
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can obtain that EKS < EN , GN < GKS , and wN < wKS .
When Ã < A < v−1(G0), both Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky solutions are








· E1(A) = EN . (6.3)
Since both solutions are on Bl(A), EKS + GKS = EN + GN . Thus, from
this and 6.3, GKS > GN . From E = f(l0)− w and 6.3, wKS > wN .
When v−1(G0) ≤ A < ṽ−1(g), the bargaining problem is symmetric. Thus,
the employer and the guardian get same payoffs at both solutions.
The following proposition summarizes the result of this section.
Proposition 7. In the bargaining model with an altruistic guardian,
1. When 0 ≤ A < Â,
both solutions are on the curve part of the bargaining set.
It is ambiguous to compare two solutions.
2. When Â ≤ A ≤ Ã,
Nash solution is on the curve part of the bargaining set and Kalai Smorodin-
sky solution is on the line part of the bargaining set.
Thus, EN > EKS, GN < GKS, wN < wKS, and EN + GN < EKS +
GKS.
3. When Ã < w̄ < v−1(G0),
both solutions are on the line part of the bargaining set.
GN < GKS, EN > EKS, wN < wKS, and EN +GN = EKS +GKS.
4. When v−1(G0) < A < ṽ
−1(g),
both solutions are the mid point of the line part of the bargaining set.
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Thus, EN = EKS, GN = GKS, and wN = wKS.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited the analysis of child labor by using a bar-
gaining approach. First, we looked Gupta (2000)’s model and solved the bar-
gaining game with and without the minimum wage by using Nash and Kalai
Smorodinsky solutions. When the minimum wage is below a certain level, the
wage of the child worker, the guardian’s payoff, and the sum of the employer
and the guardian’s payoffs of Kalai Smorodinsky solution are greater than or
equal to those of Nash solution. On the other hand, the meal provision and
the employer’s profit of Kalai Smorodinsky solution are less than or equal to
those of Nash solution. Thus, Kalai Smorodinsky solution is more favorable
to the guardian in comparison with Nash solution. Moreover, the range of the
minimum wage where the policy is effective is broader at Kalai Smorodinsky
solution than at Nash solution. The minimum wage policy induces the reduc-
tion of the employer’s profit. However, it does not always imply the increase
of the guardian’s payoff. The policy may induce the decrease of both players’
payoffs.
The second part of this paper has modified Gupta (2000)’s model and
introduced the guardian’s income, bequest, and child altruism. This model
suggests a consistent result with Basu and Van (1998)’s luxury axiom about
child labor supply in that there exists a subsistence level of the guardian’s
income, below which the child labor is supplied. Then, we have solved the
bargaining solution by using two solution concepts. The comparative statics of
Nash solution on A shows that child labor wage decreases until the guardian’s
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income reaches some level, then it increases as the guardian’s income exceeds
that level. Thus, when A is below some level, as A increases, both individuals’
payoffs increase. This implies that the subsidy policy toward a poor guardian
induces Pareto improvement. However, at Kalai Smorodinsky solution, the
policy may not induce Pareto improvement. We have found the condition that
the subsidy policy induces both players’ payoffs to increase under sufficiently
small A. When A is small, it is not easy to compare Nash solution and Kalai
Smorodinsky solution. However, when A is above some level and still so small
that child is working, the guardian’s payoff of Kalai Smorodinsky solution
is greater than or equal to that of Nash solution. Still in this case, Kalai
Smorodinsky solution is more favorable to the guardian than Nash solution.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 When 0 ≤ w̄ ≤ t∗, the wages and the meal
provisions of both solutions are equal to w∗ and t∗ respectively. Thus, E, G,
and E + G of both solutions are exactly same and they are equal to E∗, G∗,
E∗ +G∗.
When w̄ is greater than t∗ and less than or equal to w∗, both Nash bargain-
ing solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution are on Bl(w̄), which implies that
the meal provisions of both solutions are equal to t∗. However, the wage of
Kalai Smorodinsky solution is greater than that of Nash bargaining solution,
i.e., wKS ≥ wN = w∗. This can be easily shown by using w∗ = t∗ + 12h(t∗),
(4.5), and h(t∗) ≥ h(w̄). From wKS > wN and tKS = tN , it can be derived
that EKS < EN , GKS > GN , and EKS +GKS = EN +GN .
When w̄ is greater than w∗ and less than ŵ, Nash bargaining solution is on
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Bc(w̄) and Kalai Smorodinsky solution is on Bl(w̄). Thus, wN = w̄ and tKS =




h(w̄) . By using this and (4.5),
it can be shown that the wage of Kalai Smorodinsky solution is greater than
w̄, i.e., wKS > w. We already have shown that tN is greater than t∗, which
is equal to the transfer of Kalai Smorodinsky solution, on section 4.2. From
wKS > wN and tKS < tN , we can easily show that EKS = f(tKS) − wKS is
less than EN = f(tN )−wN , GKS = wKS−tKS is greater than GN = wN−tN ,
and EKS +GKS = f(tKS)− tKS is greater than EN +GN = f(tN )− tN .
When w̄ is greater than ŵ, both Nash solution and Kalai Smorodinsky
solution are on Bc(w̄), which implies that the wages of both solutions are
equal to w̄. Thus, it remains to compare tN and tKS . However, unlike the
previous cases, it is ambiguous which one is greater. It is obvious that tN is
greater than tKS near ŵ, since tN > 1 and tKS = 1 at ŵ. However, we cannot
predict which one is greater.
We will provide two examples which induce opposite results. First, let us
consider f1(t) =
1
10 · ln (10t− 9) + 2, of which t∗ is equal to 1 and f(t∗) = 2.
Table 1 provides the approximated meal provision level of Nash bargaining
solution and Kalai Smorodinsky solution. As we can see in the table, when w̄
is near ŵ, tN is greater than tKS , however, when as w̄ increases, tKS becomes
greater than tN .






which has smaller curvature than f1(t), so that the reduced area of the feasible
set produced by f2(t) is less than that by f1(t). t
∗ of f2(t) is also equal to
1 and f(t∗) = 2. Table 2 provides the approximated meal provision levels of
both solutions. We do not exactly know which one is greater, since they are
approximated value. However, we can see that, when w̄ is less than f(t∗),
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tN and tKS are close. On the other hand, when w̄ > f(t∗), tN is apparently
greater than tKS , which is an opposite result to f1(t).
w̄ ŵ = 1.641 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.95 2.1 2.2
tN
1.049 1.075 1.134 1.217 1.273 1.544 1.899
tKS
1 1.041 1.128 1.233 1.294 1.553 1.900
Table 1: The meal provision levels when f1(t) =
1
10 · ln (10t− 9) + 2
w̄ ŵ = 1.502 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.95 2.1 2.5
tN
1.002 1.099 1.297 1.397 1.447 1.597 2.000
tKS
1 1.098 1.297 1.397 1.447 1.479 1.881
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